In small groups, norm enforcement is achieved through mutual punishment and reward. In large societies, norms are enforced by specialists such as government officials. However, not every public cause is overseen by states, for instance those organized at the international level. This paper shows how non-governmental norm enforcement can emerge as a decentralized equilibrium. As a first stage, individuals voluntarily contribute to a non-governmental agency that produces an incentive system. The second stage is the provision of a public good on the basis of private contributions. The incentive system punishes and rewards deviations from the norm for contributions by means of public approval or disapproval of behavior. It is shown that, even in large populations, nongovernmental norm enforcement can be supported in a non-cooperative equilibrium of utilitymaximizing individuals.
Introduction
In small groups, mutual punishing and rewarding promotes the compliance of the individual members of the group with the prevailing norms. In large groups, or at the level of entire societies, the implementation of punishments and rewards is delegated to specialists.
Usually we think of the state as the institution responsible for norm enforcement. But in some contexts, there may be no state with coercive power available. Global public goods are the most salient examples of this type of situation.
1 Although governmental power may be expanded by means of international contracts between national governments, this is not the only possibility. We can also observe non-governmental agencies developing normative powers. For instance, environmental organizations run campaigns intended to induce consumers or firms to contribute to environmental quality.
Such non-governmental activities have the following economic structure: A set of individuals provides in the form of voluntary contributions , , a certain volume of resources ∑ , for financing an enterprise that exerts social pressure by means of public approval or disapproval of behavior. The system is targeted at a group of individuals who contribute , to a public good ∑ . Approval or disapproval of contribution behavior to the public good establishes a norm.
Sets and may be distinct in some cases, while in other cases they may overlap or coincide. Political pressure, partly organized by environmental groups, was exerted on producers of detergents containing phosphates in the 1970s (see, e.g. Stø, Throne-Holst and Vittersø [2005, p. 333] ), for example, and the specific individual group of companies targeted by the protests was not congruent with the group of financiers supporting the involved environmental groups. Some environmental groups however target potentially everybody, e.g. by stigmatizing to fly by plane since flying strongly contributes to global warming. 2 In such cases there is obviously some degree of overlap between the target group and the group of financiers. This paper provides an economic explanation as to why rational in- 1 Cowen [2002] considers norms that may potentially solve public good problems. His analysis is based on the 'esteem theory' which postulates that granting of esteem is costless such that no free-rider problem is involved in the supply of esteem (Cowen [2002, p. 211] ). Also see Brennan and Brooks [2007] . 2 Some of these groups simultaneously sell carbon offsets. The purchase of such offsets can be regarded as public good provision (climate protection) motivated, in part, to compensate for activities diminishing the public good (stable climate).
dividuals voluntarily contribute to , even when this forces them (as members of ) to comply with some norm regarding contributions to .
Behavioral economics has provided insights into how cooperation in groups can be sustained by altruistic punishment and altruistic rewarding Gächter [2000, 2002] , Fehr and Fischbacher [2003] ). Such enforcement is based on personal interaction between agents. In large associations, effective norm enforcement is more formal and often involves professional staff. Yamagishi [1986] , for instance, proposed a distinction between "elementary cooperation" and "instrumental cooperation". Since in large groups it is not possible to guarantee elementary cooperation by means of mutual control, people cooperate at an instrumental level by establishing a sanctioning system. He supports this idea with experimental evidence. 3 Elster [1989, p. 100] distinguished between social and legal norms: "Legal norms are enforced by specialists ... social norms are enforced by members of the general community." It is important to note that the state is not the only example of an institution that practices norm enforcement through specialists.
In the case of government enforcement, a central authority stipulates how much citizens must contribute to the public good as well as to the funds required for financing the police and the tax officials who enforce the prescribed contributions. What nongovernmental agencies have in common with governments is the basic economic fact that resources have to be invested in manpower and technical equipment with the purpose of effectively inducing contributions to . But the two institutions also differ in two important respects which is due to the divergence in their disposability of means of coercion. First, non-governmental norm enforcement, as considered in this paper, must induce contributions to by means of incentives rather than coercive power. Second, non-governmental bodies only command resources raised through voluntary contributions in a noncooperative equilibrium.
In order to explain non-governmental norm enforcement as an outcome of decentralized decision-making by free and rational individuals, contributions to public goods are modeled as strategies in a non-cooperative game (Cornes and Sandler [1996] ). Agents are endowed with an economic resource and can choose between private consumption and a pure public good (the intrinsic public good). At Stage 1, they individually decide how much of their en-dowment they will pay to an enforcement agency. 4 In the second stage, the individuals decide how much they will contribute to the (intrinsic) public good. Without norm enforcement, the intrinsic public good is supplied inefficiently because of free-riding. In particular,
per-capita contributions decrease and eventually vanish if population size increases. The enforcement agency increases the incentive to contribute to the public good by using the funds raised at Stage 1 to exert social pressure that punishes agents contributing less than the norm and rewards those contributing more. 5 The larger the enforcement funds provided at Stage 1, the more powerful are the punishments and rewards. The norm is defined by the average contribution.
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The reason why effective public norm enforcement can emerge as a decentralized equilibrium of utility-maximizing individuals derives from interacting external effects in the contribution games to and . As Coleman [1990, p. 251] pointed out, interests in a norm arise when "an action has similar externalities for a set of others". The positive external effects of a public good supplied by other individuals lead to underprovision in a non-cooperative equilibrium. This inefficiency explains why there is a need for a norm that induces individuals to contribute to the public good, and this need is a potential opportunity for entrepreneurial activity. People are willing to pay for an enterprise that internalizes the positive externalities of public good provision through appropriate incentives. By contributing to at Stage 1, an individual can penalize free-riding at Stage 2. This paper shows that such nongovernmental norm enforcement is supported by substantial voluntary contributions even if the size of the population is large. However, the sanctions and rewards produced are not always sufficient to overcome free-riding in the -contribution game at Stage 2.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 discusses related work on organizations and institutions. Section 3 outlines the basic model and the Aggregative Games Approach (developed by Hartley [2003, 2007] ). Section 4 deals with the scenario where approval or disapproval based on relative performance comprises both a punishment and a reward component. Moreover, it is reasonable to use both tools. For instance, experiments by Andreoni, Harbough, and Vesterlund [2003] show that "cooperation ... is most successfully enforced in an environment in which both punishments and rewards are available" (p. 901). 6 It is known that punishing and rewarding deviations from an average can induce efficient contribution levels with respect to a public good. See Falkinger [1996] for a theoretical analysis and Falkinger et al. [2000] or Bracht, Figuères, and Ratto [2008] 
Related Literature
The problem of individual support for public norm enforcement is related to the formation of organizations. As Olson [1965] pointed out, an important characteristic of organizations is "the furtherance of interests of their members", that is, the provision of some collective good. And "just as a state cannot support itself by voluntary contributions ... neither can other large organizations support themselves without providing some sanctions ... that will lead individuals to help bear the burdens of maintaining the organization" (p. 15). Seen from this perspective, the question that arises is why individuals join an association and submit to the rules of that association in the first place. In our analysis, membership contracts with rights and duties play no role. Instead, non-governmental organizations are seen as enterprises in which individuals can invest. In return, rather than financial dividends, the individuals receive (indirectly) increased contributions to a public good they appreciate.
A related issue is the emergence of states. Following John Locke, the theory of social contracts has argued that "rational individuals, each possessing natural rights, will engage in a joint social contract to give up to a central authority those rights which if held and exercised centrally will make them better off" (Coleman [1990, p. 328] Moreover, just as with private production technologies, the fact that a certain public enforcement technology is feasible does not mean that it is actually used. Generating output requires employment of input. The analysis presented here explains the contribution of resources to operate the enforcement technology. Since, by assumption, the resources are 8 State institutions such as courts may also be used as leverage for non-governmental norm enforcement. It is also true, however, that state institutions limit the feasible technology for non-governmental enforcement to legal instruments. 9 Johansson-Stenman and Konow [2010, pp. 154-155, 158] consider the equality norm in the context of fairness and they argue that (even undemocratic) governments "are usually subject, to some degree, to the views and passions of their constituents, and fairness likely plays a significant role in the motives of the latter." 10 Non-governmental organizations on a sub-national level may punish or reward individual people's behavior not exclusively by generating some kind of social pressure but, as Kotchen [2009, p. 884] indicates with respect to some religious groups, also by claiming monetary penance for acts violating a respective group's rules or norms.
given voluntarily by free and rational agents, legitimacy is not an issue. The problem is to attain efficiency and, in particular, whether or not support of public norm enforcement breaks down if the number of individuals becomes very large and there is no personal relationship to control free-riding.
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Finally, the analysis is related to Okada's [1993 Okada's [ , 1997 non-cooperative approach to social organizations. 12 Also discussed in Okada's work is the possibility of individuals giving to a professional enforcement agency the economic means to sanction free-riding. However, in this case, they have to join a social organization that collectively decides on the strength of punishment and the allocation of enforcement costs among members. Moreover, only members of the organization are subject to enforcement. Non-members can free-ride the benefits of the social organization. In this paper, by contrast, individuals need not enter into a social relationship and negotiate or vote on the resources spent on enforcement. No collective decision-making is involved at any stage. Each individual decides on his/her own how much to give to the enforcement agency. Moreover, the punishment-reward scheme implemented by the agency can be targeted at any set of agents, regardless of an agent's support of enforcement through his/her own investments. This is an important feature of nongovernmental public norm enforcement by means of incentive schemes, in contrast to norm enforcement by means of regulations within an association. A consumer cannot choose whether or not to be exposed to a campaign against the fur trade by organizations for animal protection. Nor can firms avoid being under the spotlight of environmental groups or escape public discussion of social responsibility. And whether policemen contribute or not to human rights watch organizations, they are still subject to observation and critical assessment by such organizations. The basic assumption of this paper is that the efficiency and the economic resources of non-governmental enterprises determine how much pressure their approval or disapproval exerts on the subjects in their focus.
General Framework
The economy consists of a set 
The sanction level that ascertains the degree of approval of agent i B  depends on the difference between her own contribution to the public good and the average contribution made by the other members of group B , such that
In the punishment-reward scheme as described by eq. (2) the parameter  indicates the strength of (positive or negative) sanctions that agent i B  experiences when she deviates from average public good contributions as the norm. This gives a motive to care more about the public good -not because of some 'warm glow effect' in the sense of Andreoni [1990] , but due to the approval and disapproval of deviations from the norm.
14 Norm compliance induced by internalized psychological control mechanisms would mean that the punishment-reward strength parameter  is exogenously given without requiring any economic resources. Here, however, it is supposed that  is endogenous and depends on the expenditures E that are made for establishing and operating an enforcement agency. Hence,
which is assumed to be a twice differentiable function of E which has
More resources allow for a higher degree of enforcement, for instance by more frequent inspection and more effective monitoring of contribu-
, while the marginal productivity of enforcement expenditures is
Under non-governmental norm enforcement, E is also a public good whose supply is game: At stage 1, the agents from group A non-cooperatively contribute to the enforcement fund E run by a non-governmental agency. At stage 2, the agents from group B noncooperatively contribute to the public good G under the punishment reward scheme described by eq. (2). We intend to characterize subgame-perfect equilibria of this two-stage game. As a first step we apply the Aggregative Game Approach developed by Hartley [2003, 2007] to analyze the equilibria which result for a given size A E of the enforcement fund at stage 2 of the game.
Under the punishment-reward scheme given by eq. (2) for each agent in group B the effective price of the public good is changed to 1 ( )
and the marginal rate of transfor-mation between the private good and the public good G becomes Falkinger [1996] ). The assumptions made for ( )
In an interior stage 2-equilibrium where all agents in B make a strictly positive contribution to the public good G the marginal rate of substitution must be equal to ( ) A E  . For any marginal rate of substitution  between the private and the public good we now denote an agent´s consumption expansion path by ( , ) h G  with partial
(from quasi-concavity of the utility function and normality of both goods).
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Then, given some A E , each agent i B  has private consumption
in an interior stage 2-equilibrium, if public good supply is G .
For a characterization of the stage 2-equilibrium by means of the Aggregative Game Approach the aggregate budget constraint for group B has to be observed such that public good supply ˆ( , )
A B
G E E at stage 2 depends on A E and B E and is then implicitly given by
In this aggregate budget constraint the individual rewards and punishments i r do not matter since it directly follows from eq. (2) 
Sanctioning Other People´s Behavior
We first consider the case of a non-governmental agency that focuses sanctions on a The function
( )
A G E which is twice differentiable for all A E defines a (normally nonlinear) indirect contribution 'technology' for the public good G. By taking the derivative of (4), the marginal rate of transformation between the fund A E and public good G is
The inequality in (5) holds since 1 0 h  and 2 0. h  Given some level of A E , an agent in group A has an incentive to increase unilaterally her contribution to the investment fund if and only if
Based on inequality (6) For sufficiently large n B , existence of an equilibrium that fulfills condition (7) is ensured if in addition to the conditions imposed above the following is assumed: h 1 and h 2 are continuous for all G ≥ 0 and μ ≥ 1, and h 1 and h 2 ∈ [a,b] for some constants a and b. The lefthand side of (7) Comparative statics effects are hard to obtain in the case of a general utility function. As a next step we therefore assume that all agents have the Cobb-Douglas utility function
Letting 1      , the consumption expansion path for any given
The equilibrium condition (7) 
Proof:
The left-hand side of eq. (10) E n e  increased, the right-hand side of (10) would become larger and no equilibrium could be attained. QED
In general, the degree of enforcement depends on both the volume of available enforcement resources E and the number of agents B n whose norm compliance is to be con- (1 )(1 )
For this specific situation we have some additional results.
Proposition 3:
In the Cobb-Douglas case with an enforcement technology (11) contributions to the enforcement fund are i) increasing in B n if  is low and ii) decreasing in .
Proof:
For part (i), check 0, if 1 1 . The inequality is equivalent to the condition 1 .
For approaching zero, the left-hand side is equal to one, while the right-hand side becomes 1. Thus, 0 and 0.
16 Hence, we set ß 1 . This effective sanctioning rate indicates that sanctioning is the stronger, the higher the payments for E and -provided there is rivalry in norm-enforcement -the lower the number of agents in group B.
Part ii) follows from 0.
Norm Enforcement with Universal Coverage: Sanctioning Everybody
As a second special case we consider the situation in which the group B whose members contribute to the public good G comprises the whole economy, i.e. B N  , and thus , while the group A whose members also contribute to the enforcement may also be equal to N or may, alternatively, be a subgroup of N . All agents in the economy are assumed to have the same income level y . For the sake of abbreviation define
G E E is given by (4) for , and
Concerning public good supply and the private consumption levels of all agents, the equilibrium at stage 2 therefore is completely the same irrespective of whether A coincides with the whole group N or is only a subgroup N of arbitrary size.
Note that it is a direct implication of the equilibrium condition (4) that each agent in the subgroup A has the same private consumption level in an equilibrium at stage 2 as each agent outside A , which means that any agent´s contribution to the enforcement fund E is completely offset by a reduction of her contribution to the public good G .
Looking at the first stage of the game, the condition that characterizes the level * E of the enforcement fund in the subgame perfect equilibrium is
or equivalently, observing that
Since the size of group A neither matters for this condition, we have the following result:
 , then the subgame perfect equilibrium, as characterized by (14), does not depend on the size A n of subgroup A . In the subgame perfect equilibrium all agents have the same private consumption level, irrespective of whether they are in group A or not.
For the further analysis we get, now omitting all variables, from (1) and (4) that
Then, the equilibrium condition (14) becomes
h  and 2 0 h  , due to quasi-concavity and normality the denominator in (15) is always positive. Thus, as 1   , nh 2 μ' < -1 must hold in a subgame perfect equilibrium.
Based on condition (15) one can show that in the subgame perfect equilibrium the public good G is underprovided in a certain sense. 
As for any fixed initial endowment, public good supply is increasing in  , this implies 
in the special case treated in this section and assuming Cobb-Douglas preferences, condition (4), which gives public good supply in the equilibrium at stage 2, is
Using (19) in (17) and observing that 1
Using equation (20) we get the following comparative statics results.
Concerning the enforcement technology we now make the assumption that
Assumption (21) is clearly fulfilled when ( )
. We get the following comparative statics results.
Proposition 6: As long as the agents have Cobb-Douglas preferences and assumption (21) holds, total contributions (20) falls when Y grows. Furthermore, (ii) is obtained because adding one agent to the economy increases the right-hand side of (20) whereas its left-hand side is constant.
In order to determine how average contributions to the enforcement fund
depend on the size of the economy, we again assume the specific type of enforcement technology as described by (11). Then equilibrium condition (20) turns into
Then we get additional results on the effects that are implied by an increasing size of the economy. (ii) never larger than 2 y .
Proof: With the same argument as applied in the proof of Proposition 6, the assertion in part (i) follows since, given
  , the right-hand side of (22) These results which are in sharp contrast to those obtained in the standard situation of voluntary provision of an intrinsic public good (see Andreoni [1988] ) show that free-riding in supplying the second-order public good 'enforcement' is less a problem in large societies than in small groups. Per-capita contributions to the enforcement fund do not only rise with average income but also with the size of the population. This means that also in large societies strictly positive contributions to enforcement result as a non-cooperative outcome and enforcement funds can be raised successfully by a non-governmental agency. The reason is that individuals anticipate that by contributing to enforcement with universal coverage, they are exerting pressure on themselves and on all others to contribute to the first-order public good at the second stage of the game. In small groups, specific individual motives like altruism or some willingness to execute costly punishment may help to improve public good provision. In large anonymous societies, such reliance on altruistic behavior seems less convincing -nor is it necessary, as the analysis presented here shows.
It is worth noting that Proposition 7 holds for any Raising funds for non-governmental approval or disapproval of behavior therefore works.
But does it help to increase public good provision at the second stage of the game? There are two opposing effects at work: On the one hand the agents´ incentives to contribute to the public good G are improved by means of the enforcement mechanism. On the other hand, sanctioning is costly and thus the income left for the provision of the public good is reduced when individual contributions to the enforcement fund increase. As long as there is non-rivalry in enforcement the first effect will dominate insofar as individual contributions to the public good G is strictly bounded away from zero when the economy becomes larger, as long as there is non-rivalry in enforcement. In contrast, with complete rivalry in enforcement, individual public good contributions converge to zero when the size of the economy goes to infinity. These results are stated in the following Proposition. 
For n large enough, 
The assertion holds since the right-hand side of (25) conditions of rivalry of enforcement, the resources put into the enforcement fund do not produce enough strength for overcoming the free-riding incentives in the supply of the public good at stage 2 when n is large. given in the left half of Table 1 . It shows that contributions to the public good vanish when becomes large. By contrast, the right half shows the non-cooperative outcome resulting when individuals have the possibility of contributing to a public enforcement fund.
Adding to in Table 1 , we come quite close to a public expenditure share of 25 percent in the non-cooperative equilibrium. Part of this expenditure is absorbed by the financing of enforcement measures. Due to economies of scale, if 0 given the specification of the enforcement technology in (11), this part shrinks as n becomes large. The results show that non-cooperative support of public good provision through non-governmental norm enforcement can be quite efficient, even if economies are as large as the largest countries in the world. Obviously, the assumption of non-rivalry of makes the enforcement particularly effective. This is why the utility gains shown in Table 1 ( compared to utility levels achieved without enforcement possibilities) are huge. In the next section, the assumption of non-rivalry is abandoned. will be a public good only insofar as nobody is excluded from its effects.
No enforcement 
Conclusions
Enforcing a norm involves a twofold public good problem. First, complying with a norm means that agents contribute a certain amount to a public good . For instance, behaving in accordance with environmental standards improves environmental quality. This is why norm compliance is desirable in the first place. Second, enforcing the norm is also a public good, subject to the following free-rider incentive: Let others pay the funds required for financing enforcement activities. To cope with these two aspects, the determinants and the effects of non-governmental norm enforcement were analyzed in a two-stage non-cooperative contribution game.
We first characterized the size of funds raised in equilibrium when the nongovernmental agency targets its activities at a subgroup of agents and invites the rest of the population to finance these activities. We then considered the alternative case of universal coverage, under which the population that finances the enforcement agency coincides with the population monitored by the agency. In both cases we showed that norm enforcement can be sustained as a non-cooperative equilibrium even in large populations with standard non-altruistic preferences.
These results explain why fund-raising for non-governmental norm enforcement is successful. In a further step, its effectiveness was examined. The purpose of norm enforcement is to induce people to contribute to a public good . The results for the aggregate supply of induced by non-governmental sanctioning of contribution behavior depend on the properties of the enforcement technology. If enforcement activities are non-rival -that is, if surveillance and public approval/disapproval involve mainly fixed costs -then the funds raised in non-cooperative equilibrium suffice to induce substantial supply. Numerical calculations demonstrated that almost an efficient level of supply can be induced through nongovernmental norm enforcement -even in a society as large as the world's population. If enforcement activities are subject to rivalry -resources employed for inspection of agent cannot be used for inspecting agent -non-governmental norm enforcement still has a positive effect on public good provision. However, as population size approaches infinity, this effect vanishes. In sum, in a large population, establishing a satisfactory norm through nongovernmental activities is more difficult (though not impossible) than raising funds for nongovernmental activities.
